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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE BRITISH
DOMINIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS*
BY ARTICLE I of the covenant "The original members of the
League of Nations shall be those of the signatories which are
named in the annex to this covenant and also such of those other
states named in the annex as shall accede without reservation to
this covenant."1  Among the original signatories named in the
annex are: The British Empire, Canada, Australia, South Africa,
New Zealand and India. By article III the assembly "shall consist
of representatives of the members of the League. . . . At
meetings of the assembly each member of the League shall have
one vote and may not have more than three representatives."
The provision for British representation is perhaps the most
striking feature in the constitution of the assembly. The United
Kingdom, strange to say, loses its identity as an international
state and in so doing forfeits its right to distinct representation. 2
It is absorbed in the British Empire and secures representation
as a part of that empire. India and the self-governing colonies,
on the other hand, are accorded a privileged position in the
League. They are given separate representation in their own
names and are furthermore represented through the British
Empire. Their international status, like their constitutional, is
indeed a most anomalous one. They are suspended like Mo-
hammed's coffin, between heaven and earth. They have achieved
the miraculous in their constitutions, since they have combined
the attributes of nationality with the status of dependency. In
short, they defy all scientific classifications according to the
recognized forms of modern states. They stand in a distinct
category of their own; they are both states and colonies at one
and the same time.
*[This article, though complete in itself, is a continuation of the sub-
ject discussed by the same author, Representation on the Council of the
League of Nations, 4 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEv 147. Ed.]
1 Treaty of Peace with Germany, International Conciliation, No. 142,
Sept. 1919.
2The League of Nations and the British Commonwealth, The Round
Table, No: 35, p. 479. June, 1919.
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The explanation of this political anomaly must be sought in
the constitutional development and organization of the British
dominions.
The gradual transformation of the colonies from mere pos-
sessions into autonomous nations has largely escaped the atten-
tion of the outside world. The process at first was essentially
constitutional in character, but lately it has taken on certain
international aspects. At the time of the grant of responsible
government to the colonies about the middle of the nineteenth
century, certain subjects were reserved for the exclusive deter-
muination of the imperial government and parliament. Among
these questions were imperial fiscal policy and foreign relations.
3
The reservation of the treaty making power was regarded as
essential to the maintenance of the unity of the empire. A treaty
concluded by the crown on the advice of the imperial ministry
was automatically binding on all the oversea possessions in the
absence of express language to the contrary.
The colonies soon found, however, that this power seriously
limited their rights of self-government, particularly in respect
to fiscal matters, about which they were especially sensitive. They
accordingly protested to the Colonial Office against this restriction
and after considerable discussion the British government agreed
that for the future, commercial treaties should not be auto-
matically extended to the colonies but that the latter should have
the option of adhering to such treaties within a specified period
of time.' Not long after the colonies went one step further and
claimed the right of separate withdrawal from imperial treaties.
The British government again gave way and in compliance with
the colonial demand adopted the policy of inserting an express
provision in its commercial agreements safeguarding the inde-
pendent rights of the dominions to withdraw upon due notice.'
According to present constitutional practice, therefore, the British
3 In his celebrated report, Lord Durham expressly reserved "the regu-
lation of foreign relations and of trade, etc.," to the mother country.
Lewis, The Government of Dependencies, Introduction by C. P. Lewis,
p. xxxi.
4 Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, vol. III, p. 1109;
Ewart, The Kingdom of Canada, p. 13; Canada, Sess. Pap., 1892, no. 24,p. 7.p Ibid. The imperial conference of 1911 adopted a resolution "that his
majesty's government be requested to open negotiations with the several
foreign governments having commercial treaties which apply to the over-
seas Dominions with a view to securing liberty for any of those dominions
which may so desire to withdraw from the operation of the treaty with-
out impairing the treaty in respect to the rest of the empire."
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government, in the words of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, never nego-
tiates a commercial treaty without putting in a stipulation that
the treaty will not apply to Canada or any of the self-governing
dominions except with their consent.6
But. the colonies were by no means satisfied with these con-
cessions. They were desirous of securing the additional right of
independent negotiation with foreign powers. In 1879 the Cana-
dian government declared in a memo to the imperial authorities
"that the large and rapidly augmenting commerce of Canada
and increasing extent of her trade with foreign nations is prov-
ing the absolute necessity of direct negotiations with them for
the proper protection of her interests."'7 The British government
objected strongly at first to the full recognition of this claim "as
equivalent to breaking up the Empire" but by way of compro-
mise agreed to the policy of associating colonial delegates with
the imperial representatives in the negotiation of treaties, though
the power and responsibility of conducting the negotiations were
still retained by the British diplomatic officers. The procedure
to be followed was laid down by Lord Ripon:
"In order to give due help in the negotiations, her majesty's
representative should as a rule be assisted by a delegate appointed
by the colonial government either as a plenipotentiary or in a
subordinate capacity as the circumstances might require. If as
a result of the negotiations any arrangements were arrived at
they would require approval of her majesty's government and by
the colonial government and also by the colonial legislature if
they involved action before the ratification took place. ' 8
By this procedure the British government hoped to secure "at
once the strict observance of existing international obligations
and the preservation of the unity of the empire."
But this mode of conducting negotiations soon underwent an
important modification. The colonial representative, as we have
seen, was expected to act in a subordinate or advisory capacity
to the British diplomatic officer, but in actual practice he soon
6 Speech of Sir Wilfrid Laurier at Simcoe, Aug. 15, 1911. Porritt,
Evolution of the Dominion of Canada, p. 216, note. See also proceedings
of the Imperial Conference, 1911, p. 116.
7 Tupper, The Treaty Making Powers of the Dominions, 17 J. of Soc.
of Comp. Leg. 7. A short but excellent outline of the growth of the
treaty making powers of the dominions will be found in Ewart, The King-
dom Papers pp. 69-81.
s Dispatch of Lord Ripon, June 28, 1895, Parl. Pap. C 7824; Keith,
Responsible Government in the Dominions, vol. 3, p. 116; Evart, The
Kingdom Papers, pp. 68-81; Myers, Representation in Public International
Unions, 8 J. of Int. Law 106.
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acquired an equal and quasi-independent status.9 It was then
but a short step to the practical elimination of the British repre-
sentative from the course of negotiations. The Canadian reci-
procity treaty with France in 1907 marked the triumph of the
principle of colonial autonomy in foreign affairs. In a dispatch
to the charg6 d'affaires at Paris, Sir Edward Grey declared :10
"The selection of the negotiator is principally a matter of con-
venience, and,. in the present circumstances, it will obviously be
more practical that the negotiations should be left to Sir Wilfrid
Laurier and to the Canadian Minister of Finance, who will
doubtless keep you informed of their progress.
"If the negotiations are brought to a conclusion at Paris, you
should sign the agreement jointly with the Canadian negotiator,
who would be given full powers for the purpose."
In speaking of these negotiations in the House of Commons,
Mr. Balfour stated:11
"The Dominion of Canada technically, I suppose it may be
said, carried on their negotiations with the knowledge of his
majesty's representatives, but it was a purely technical knowl-
edge. I do not believe that his majesty's government was ever
consulted at a single stage of those negotiations. I do not believe
they ever informed themselves or offered any opinion as to what
was the best policy for Canada under the circumstances. I think
they were well-advised. But how great is the change and how
inevitable. It is a matter of common knowledge and may I add,
not a matter of regret but a matter of pride and rejoicing that the
great dominions beyond the seas are becoming great nations in
themselves."
In theory, however, the principle of imperial unity was still
maintained. The colonial delegates were appointed by the British
government and the treaty itself was duly submitted to the im-
perial government for examination and final ratification. The
negotiations, it is true, were carried on by colonial representatives
but the treaty derived its legal character solely and exclusively
from its imperial sanction. In short, from the legal standpoint,
a treaty thus concluded, was an imperial and not a colonial agree-
ment. The autonomy of the dominions was in law far from
complete.
But this procedure was too cumbersome for the colonies.
They desired direct action without imperial interference. Aus-
9 Tupper, op. cit., p. 8; Todd, Parliamentary Government in the Brit-
ish Colonies, 2nd ed., p. 268-273; Ewart, The Kingdom Papers p. 69-73.
10 Myers, Representation in Public International Unions, 8 J. of Int.
Law 106; Ewart, The Kingdom Papers, p. 5.
11 Tupper, op. cit., p. 14.
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tralia led the way by entering into an agreement with the Japanese
consul in the commonwealth for special facilities of transit and
trade for Japanese students, tourists and merchants. 12  This
precedent was followed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in a number of
important agreements with the consular representatives of for-
eign nations at Ottawa.' These negotiations were carried on
with the, full knowledge and approval of the British government,
but the latter took no part whatever in the making or execution
of the same. The agreements took the form of concurrent legis-
lative action on the part of the contracting parties in order to
avoid the necessity for formal ratification on the part of the im-
perial government. In commenting on one of these treaties, Sir
Wilfrid Laurier declared : 14
"It has long been the desire, if I mistake not, of the Canadian
people that we should be entrusted with the negotiation of our
own treaties, especially in regard to commerce and this looked-for
reform has come to be a living reality. Without revolution,
without any breaking of the old traditions, without any impair-
ment of our allegiance, the time has come when Canadian
interests are entrusted to Canada, and just within the last week
a treaty had been concluded with France-a treaty which appeals
to Canadians alone and which has been negotiated by Canad~ans
alone."
But these agreements, it will be observed, are almost exclu-
sively of a commercial character. The imperial government has
retained to a much larger degree its original control over matters
of a distinctly political character. 5 The colonies, however, have
begun to invade this special preserve. It has long been a recog-
nized principle of imperial policy that the British government
must consult the dominions in respect to all political treaties
which affected their interests. 6 - This policy was successfully
followed in the course of British negotiations with the United
States over the Newfoundland fisheries' 7 and with France in the
I2 Keith, op. cit., p. 1133.
13 "This tendency," Mr. Jebb declares, "was viewed with alarm by
some in Britain as leading up to a demand for the regular diplomatic
representation of foreign powers at Ottawa, and of Canada at foreign
capitals." Jebb, The Britannic Question, p. 182; Ewart, op. cit., p. 14;
Ewart, The Kingdom Papers, p. 75.
14 Tupper, op. cit., p. 14; Ewart, The Kingdom Papers, p. 75.
Is Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1911, p. 116.16 The Colonial Conference of 1902 adopted a resolution "that so far
as may be consistent with the confidential negotiations of treaties with
foreign powers, the views of the colonies affected should be obtained in
order that they may be in a better position to give adhesion to such
treaties."
1 Keith, op. cit., p. 1113.
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case of the New Hebrides. An even more striking example of
the growing independence of the dominions may be seen in the
recent treaties with the United States regarding arbitration and
pecuniary claims."" In both these treaties the British government
expressly reserves the right to obtain the concurrence of the
dominions whose interests are affected by the reference of the
dispute to arbitration.
As the dominions are still an integral part of the empire from
the standpoint of international law, they have not yet secured the
right to send and receive diplomatic officers. The consuls who
are accredited to the dominions enjoy, it is true, certain limited
diplomatic privileges and exercise, as we have seen, quasi-diplo-
matic functions. But they are not actually invested with a diplo-
matic character and powers. Two of the colonial governments,
however, have set up distinct departments for the direction of
international affairs. In 1900 the Australian government created
a department of external affairs 9 and a few years later Canada
followed suit. The Canadian act20 provides that:
"The secretary of state . . . shall have the conduct of all
official communications between the government of Canada and
the government of any other country in connection with the ex-
ternal affairs of Canada and shall be charged with such other
duties as may from time to time be assigned to the department by
order of the governor in council in relation to such external af-
fairs or to the conduct and management of internal or intercolo-
nial negotiations so far as they may appertain to the government
of Canada."
These departments are no mere shams.2 1 The first report of the
under-secretary of state for foreign affairs in Canada reveals a
1s Ibid, p. 1113.
'9 This act did not divest the Imperial Parliament "of its authority
over the external affairs of Australia and commit them to the Common-
wealth Parliament. Australia did not acquire the right to correspond
directly with foreign powers but could deal with them only through his
majesty's government." In other words, external meant "external to the
Commonwealth, not external to the Empire." Tupper, op. cit., p. 13. This
interpretation of the powers of the dominions was not acceptable to Sir
Wilfrid Laurier and he accordingly framed the Canadian act so as to
empower the secretary of state to deal expressly with foreign countries.
Ewart, The Kingdom Papers, p. 77.
20 Canada, 8 and 9 Ed. VII, No. 13. Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared
that Canada had "now reached a standard as a nation which necessi-
tates the establishment of a Department of External affairs," Ewart,
The Kingdom Papers, p. 77.
21. Mr. Asquith attempted to limit the authority of the Canadian gov-
ernment to intra-imperial negotiations but the Canadian act expressly
confers the power of international negotiations with any other coun-
try. Ewart, The Kingdom Papers, p. 77.
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series of international agreements with European and American
states on a variety of subject matters, both commercial and politi-
cal in character.
22
The most striking illustration of the new treaty-making pow-
ers of the dominions may be seen in the recent treaty concluded
between this country and Great Britain on behalf of Canada23
for the creation of a joint international commission for the settle-
ment of all disputes between Canada and the United States. The
three Canadian representatives on this commission, it should be
observed, are appointed by the Canadian government, not by the
British, and are solely responsible to the government and Parlia-
ment at Ottawa. By article 10 of this agreement it is provided :24
"Any questions or matters of difference arising between the
high contracting parties involving the rights, obligations or inter-
ests of the United States or of the Dominion of Canada, either
in relation to each other or to their respective inhabitants, may
be referred for decision to the International Joint Commission by
the consent of the two parties, it being understood that on the
part of the United States any such action will be by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate and on the part of his majesty's
government with the consent of the Governor-General in council."
The treaty-making power of an independent state could scarce-
ly extend further. There is here no semblance of colonial depen-
dency. On the contrary, the Canadian government treats with the
United States on terms of equality. From this point it is but a
short step to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations be-
tween Ottawa and Washington and in a recent statemenit Sir
Robert Borden has announced his intention of appointing a per-
manent Canadian representative at Washington in the near
future.
But the international interests of the dominions are not con-
fined to their immediate neighbors; they touch the whole outside
world. By force of circumstances they have also become in a
limited sense world powers, since they have world interests and
are immediately affected by the determination of world policies.
The dominions, therefore, were very much annoyed at the action
of the British government in calling the naval conference of 1909
22 Tupper, op. cit., p. 16; Ewart, The Kingdom Papers, p. 80.2SThis convention was first drawn up between the Canadian and
American governments and was thereupon submitted to the Britishgovernment for formal acceptance and ratification.
24Charles, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, etc., between
the U. S. and other powers, 1910-13, vol. 3 p. 44; Ewart, The Kingdom
Papers, p. 79.
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and agreeing to the celebrated declaration of London without con-
sulting them in regard to the matter or affording them an oppor-
tunity of participating in its proceedings. They accordingly took
advantage of the imperial conference of 1911 to raise the whole
question of the right of the dominions to be consulted in respect
to the negotiation of international conventions. 2  The British gov-
ernment frankly admitted its fault and promised to mend its
ways. 26 The conference accordingly agreed:
"(a) That the Dominions shall be afforded an opportunity of
consultation when framing the instructions to be given to British
delegates at future meetings of the Hague Conference, and that
conventions affecting the Dominions provisionally assented to at
that Conference shall be circulated among the Dominion govern-
ments for their consideration before any such convention is sign-
ed; (b) that a similar procedure where time and opportunity and
the subject matter permit shall, as far as possible, be used when
preparing instructions for the negotiations of other international
agreements affecting the Dominions.
' '27
An even more significant revelation of the development of the
international autonomy of the dominions will be found in the
separate representation of the colonies at international confer-
ences. The practice of sending colonial representatives to inter-
national congresses of a general social and economic character has
long prevailed, but in the case of political conferences the colonies
have been either omitted altogether or included in a subordinate
capacity as advisers to the imperial representatives. 2  At the inter-
national fur seal conference in 1911, for example, the Canadian
under-secretary of external affairs was associated with the other
British delegates since Canada had a material interest in that
question.
20
The right of India and the self-governing colonies to separate
representation at international conferences was first clearly recog-
nized in the International Postal Union. As the dominions had
their own national postal systems, it was not only natural but also
necessary that they should have an independent voice in the deter-
muination of matters of common concern. At the International
Postal Convention at Rome in 1906 the British Empire was repre-
25 The Prime Minister of Australia, Hon. A. Fisher, moved; "That
it is regretted that the dominions were not consulted prior to the accep-
tance by the British delegates of the terms of the Declaration of Lon-
don," etc. Proceedings of The Imperial Conference, 1911, p. 97.
26 Speech of Sir Edward Grey, Ibid, p. 114.
27 Ibid, p. 15; Myers, op. cit. p. 85.
28 Keith, Imperial- Unity and the Dominions, p. 277.
29 Ibid.
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sented by six delegates.3" The colonial representatives, it is true,
were officially accredited by the British g6vernment through the
secretary of state for the colonies, but in fact they acted indepen-
dently and not as part of the British delegation. At the London
conference on electrical units and standards in 1908 separate votes
were likewise accorded to Australia, Canada and India.3 The
United States also extended a special invitation to the Canadian
government to be present at the international conference at Wash-
ington for the protection of industrial property.1
2
An important new precedent was established at the Radio-
Telegraphic Conference in 1912.13  Heretofore, as we have seen,
the British Empire has been represented in form at least by a
single delegation. But on this occasion the delegates of the four
great self-governing dominions appeared with special credentials
under the great seal authorizing them to represent their respective
dominions with full powers and on terms of absolute equality
with the delegates from Great Britain. The colonies had at last
secured a status equal to that of the mother country; and foreign
states had given quasi-international recognition to that fact by
accepting their credentials. The precedent laid down in this case
was followed two years later at the International Conference on
the "Safety of. Life at Sea," at which Canada, Australia and New
Zealand were represented by fully accredited plenipotentiaries.
34
"The essential -difference from the new as compared with the
old practice," as Professor Keith points out,3" "lies of course in
the fact that the plenipotentiaries of the dominions are now no
longer merely plenipotentiaries for the United Kingdom. In the
case of their being included in the British delegation, the vote of
30 Ibid, p. 278. Additional representatives were given to the greater
nations "by according votes to groups of colonies." "The British colo-
nies," Mr. Sayre remarks, "are the only ones which have not always
voted with the mother country." Sayre, Experiments in International
Administration, p. 24. By the Agricultural Convention of 1915, pro-
vision was made by Art. 10 for the admission of colonies into the Insti-
tute "on the same conditions as the independent nations." For a full
discussion of the question of representation at international conferences
and on international unions, see Myers, op. cit., p. 81-108.
3' Keith, op. cit., p. 1133.
32 Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p. 278.
33Keith, The Canadian Constitution and Colonial Relations, J. of
Soc. of Comp. Leg., No. 42, p. 13. Apr. 1919.
It was agreed at this conference that colonies should be admitted to
future conferences with one vote for each colony, the limit of votes for
each sovereign being six. "Great Britain's relations with her self-gov-
erning colonies fixed her multiple representation." Myers, op. cit., p.
97-99.
34 Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p. 278.
35 Ibid.
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the British delegation must be cast in the same sense, whatever
the views of the different members; in the case of separate pleni-
potentiaries the votes of the several plenipotentiaries might be
very differently cast. This itvolves of course the curious position
that his majesty may through one set of plenipotentiaries declare
one view and through another another view. But it is merely a
common sense recognition of the diversity within the uniformity
of the empire. It is no more curious than the existence of inde-
pendent governments within the empire pursuing different poli-
cies in many respects."
The constitutional significance of these precedents, it is safe to
assert, has not been properly appreciated by the people of the
United Kingdom. Still less has their international significance
been understood by foreign nations. The separate representation
of the dominions at these conferences carried with it as a neces-
sary :corollary the'due recognition of their distinct international
status on the part of foreign nations. The transition from a colo-
nial to an international status had been going on so gradually and
unconsciously that the powers did not realize what was taking
place until they found themselves confronted at the peace con-
ference with a series of significant precedents.
The fact that these conferences dealt primarily with non-polit-
ical questions does not affect the principle at stake. No clear-cut
line can be drawn between commercial and political qlestions. In
this day of international competition in trade and commerce,
every economic question is bound up potentially if not actually
with important political issues. The point of the matter is that
the dominions had secured international recognition of their
autonomy and that recognition was as full and complete as it
could well be, short of the recognition of their absolute indepen-
dence. ,I !
This modification in the status of the dominions was carried
through the more easily by reason of the fact that it involved no
material change in the outward form of the imperial constitution.
The political evolution of the imperial constitution, like that of
the mother country, has been concealed from the general public
by a camouflage of legal fictions. The external form of the con-
stitution has been preserved amid all the changes in its spirit and
operation. The international position of the colonies furnishes
an excellent illustration of the application of this principle. To
the outside world the empire was still a constitutional unit. The
imperial government had surrendered none of its legal powers
to the ambitious dominions. The representatives of the colonies
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appeared at the international conferences in the guise of British
delegates rather than as representatives of independent states.
They owed their commissions to the crown and their acts were
subject to the ratification of the imperial government. The unity
and supremacy of the empire were apparently amply safeguard-
ed by the ultimate authority of king and parliament. But few
of the political leaders of foreign states were aware of the fact
that imperial control had lost its effectiveness and that from a
constitutional standpoint the colonies had practically become inde-
pendent nations.
In dealing with this topic early in 1914 Mr. Myers declared :38
"Moreover, in the developments of recent years such large
aggregations of territory as the British Empire have shown a ten-
dency to break up into self-governing dominions; and by the tech-
nical rules of international law the sovereignty of these divisions
of the empire is only perceptibly inchoate, even if it is optional.
The Dominion of Canada, for instance, is probably quite as much
entitled to fall within the definition of a sovereign state-though
it prefers its membership in the British Empire-as was Montene-
gro entitled to fall within that definition before the Balkan War,
notwithstanding the numerous servitudes placed upon it by the
Ottoman Empire from which it was separated and by Austria-
Hungary to which it was adjacent. The emergence of these in-
choate sovereignties constitutes a new fact which diplomacy must
face."
Such was the constitutional and international position of the
dominions in the spring of 1914. The dominions had good reason
to be satisfied with the progress they were making in the interna-
tional world. They had won a partial recognition of their inter-
national status without the sacrifices of their constitutional posi-
tion in the empire. They were soon to learn, however, that their
triumph entailed heavy international obligations. They had
claimed the right of nationality; they were now to be called upon
to assume its full responsibility. The world war was the test
of their nationalism and they nobly stood the test.
The outbreak of war raised a number of perplexing con-
stitutional and international questions for the dominions. The
decision of the British cabinet bound the whole empire in law
and in fact. Neutrality was out of the question.3 7 The colonies
were all at war whether they wished to be or not. But the
36Myers, op. cit., p. 84.
37 Curtis, The Problem of the Commonwealth, pp. 90-91. For an
interesting proposal for the neutrality of the colonies in war see the report
of the Royal Commission of Victoria on A Federal Union for the Austra-
lian colonies. Parl. Pap. 1870, Sess. 2, vol. 2, p. 247.
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dominions were still free to determine what active part, if any,
they would play in the war.38 The policy of non-participation
held out great practical advantages. It was extremely unlikely
that Germany would strike at the British colonies unless the
latter saw fit to intervene in the European struggle. Canada
might possibly have sheltered herself behind the Monroe Doc-
trine.3 9 But the dominions did not hesitate for a moment. Even
before the formal declaration of war the governments of the
respective dominions had promised to come to the assistance of
the mother country in case of necessity, and with the opening of
hostilities this pledge was backed up by the whole-hearted support
of parliament and people. 40
The action of the dominions, as we have seen, was entirely
voluntary. In theory the king is commander in chief of the mili-
tary forces of the empire,41 but in fact the colonial governments
maintain exclusive control over their own local militia. The
British government could not raise a single man or dollar with-
in the dominions without the express authorization of the colon-
ial legislature. The dispatch of colonial troops over seas was the
act of the colonies themselves and not of the British government
or empire. The same principle was operative, though to a less
degree, in the case of the naval forces of the colonies. Only two
of the dominions, namely Canada and Australia, have adopted
the policy of creating independent navies of their own. 42  But
these two governments immediately proceeded to put their ships
at the free disposal of the British admiralty. The war was
indeed an imperial war but the dominions went into it as free
and autonomous allies in a common cause.
It was soon found necessary to devise new constitutional
machinery to deal with this anomalous situation. The British
government accordingly set up the so-called imperial war cabi-
net, in which the colonies were represented by the colonial pre-
miers or other responsible ministers.4  The imperial war cabinet
38 Sir Wilfrid Laurier was a staunch advocate of the freedom of
Canada to determine whether she would take part in imperial wars or
not. Ewart, op. cit., p. 157.
39 Both Sir Robert Borden and Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared that this
would be a humiliating thing to do. The Round Table, No. 18, pp. 431-2.
40 The Round Table, No. 17, p. 181-2. Dec. 1914.
41 By section 15 of the British North America Act the command in
chief of all naval and military forces of and in Canada is vested in the
sovereign. In Australia, on the other hand, it is vested in the governor-
general as the king's representative.42 Jebb, The Britannic Question, p. 36.
43 Report of the War Cabinet, 1917, Ch. II.
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was not truly an executive body but rather a conference of Brit-
ish and over-sea ministers formed for the purpose of promoting
imperial co6peration and of exercising a general supervision over
the political and military policies of the empire during the war.
In other words, the dominions were admitted into a constitu-
tional partnership with the mother country for war purposes.
As the dominions had taken the part of full-fledged nations
in the war, it was natural that they should seek to have an equal
part in the peace settlement. Early in the war they had secured
a promise from the British government that they would be con-
sulted if possible in regard to the peace terms. 44 Accordingly
just prior to the conclusion of the armistice Lloyd George wired
Sir Robert Borden to come to London at once "in order to par-
ticipate in the deliberations which will determine the line to be
taken" by the British delegates at the interallied conference which
would precede the peace conference. 5 This invitation, it will be
observed, was to a preliminary imperial conference. There was
apparently no intention on the part of the British government to
invite the dominions to participate in the peace conference itself.
But the Canadian premier declined to accept a minor r6le for his
country and demanded an independent seat at the peace table.
"There is need of serious consideration as to the representa-
tion of the dominions in the peace negotiations. The press and
people of this country take it for granted that Canada will be
represented at the peace conference. I appreciate possible diffi-
culties as to representation of the dominions, but I hope you will
keep in mind that certainly a very unfortunate impression would
be created and possibly a dangerous feeling might be aroused if
these difficulties are not overcome by some solution which will
meet the national spirit of the Canadian people. We discussed
the subject today in council and I found among my colleagues a
striking insistence which doubtless is indicative of the general
opinion entertained in this country. In a word, they feel that
new conditions must be met by new precedents. I should be glad
for your views."",
Lloyd George readily admitted "the importance" of this sug-
gestion and with his usual diplomatic skill turned the inquiry into
an additional argument for urging the immediate attendance of
the Canadian premier.4 7  Accordingly Sir Robert Borden and
three of his ministers sailed for London where they met the repre-
44Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, p. 583, note.
45 Congressional Record, 66th Congress, I Sess., p. 7167.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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sentatives of the other self-governing dominions and India. The
colonial delegates then joined forces in pressing their demand for
separate representation at the peace conference. But their claims
were not conceded without a struggle. Unexpected opposition
was encountered, according to Mr. Sifton, from "the most con-
servative representative of the British government and the repre-
sentative of the most conservative people in Great Britain. '48
The secrets of these preliminary conferences have not yet been
divulged, so that we are left to speculate as to the person or per-
sons referred to in this statement.49 We do know, however,
that the Tory Imperialists viewed the colonial proposals with
marked disfavor. They welcomed the preliminary conference
of English and colonial statesmen as a means of formulating a
common imperial policy but they insisted most strenuously that
the empire should enter the peace conference as a unit and not
as a group of separate delegations. The Dominion representa-
tives succeeded, however, in winning Lloyd George over to their
side. That settled the matter so far as the mother country was
concerned. The British government determined to support the
colonial contentions at the peace conference and did so most
heartily.50 Various proposals were put forward as to the proper
basis of colonial representation but it was finally agreed at the
instance of Sir Robert Borden "that there should be a distinctive
representation for each dominion, similar to that accorded to the
smaller allied powers and in addition that the British represen-
tation of five delegates should be selected from day to day from
a panel made up of representatives of the United Kingdom and
the Dominions."'"
The more difficult task of gaining the support of the allied
powers had now to be faced. Matters moved smoothly at first.
At a preliminary conference in London of the three chief Euro-
pean allies, France, Italy and Great Britain, the British proposal
for the representation of the Dominions was accepted in princi-
ple. The question was again taken up by the council of ten at
48 Stevenson, The Political Status of Canada. International Rela-
tions Section. The Nation, Dec. 13, 1919. p. 750.
49 Mr. Stevenson hazards the opinion that "it was probably Mr. Bal-
four or Lord Curzon and possibly both."
50 "In all these efforts," Sir Robert Borden declared, "the dominions
had the strong and unwavering support of the British prime minister
and his colleagues." The New York Sun, Oct. 7, 1919. The Congres-
sional Record, op. cit., p. 8011.
-' Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 8010; The London Times, Week-
ly Edition, Jan. 17, 1919.
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the preliminary peace conference at Paris. At first "strong
objection was made to the proposed representation of the British
dominions."5 2 For this opposition, according to rumor, Mr. Lan-
sing was chiefly responsible. 53  The Dominions, however, refused
to yield one iota of their claims and at a subsequent meeting of
the entire imperial delegation "a firm protest was made against
any recession from the proposal adopted in London." The prop-
osition was now put up to President Wilson who finally recog-
nized the justice of the colonial contention.5 4  With the with-
drawal of American opposition the Dominion plan of representa-
tion was accepted without further controversy.
The position of the Dominion delegates throughout the con-
troversy found admirable expression in a subsequent article by
Sir Robert Borden:
"On behalf of my country I stood firmly upon this solid
ground that in this, the greatest of all world wars, in which the
world's liberty, the world's justice-in which the world's very
destiny-were at stake, Canada had led the democracies of both
the American continents. Her resolve had given inspiration, her
sacrifices had been conspicuous, her effort was unabated to the
end. The same indomitable spirit which made her capable of that
effort and sacrifice made her equally incapable of accepting at
the peace conference in the League of Nations or elsewhere a
status inferior to that accorded to nations less advanced in their
development, less amply endowed with wealth, resources and
population, no more complete in their sovereignty and far less
conspicuous in their sacrifices."55
Thanks to this concession, the dominions were placed in a
privileged position in the conference. They had their own sepa-
rate representation in the general assembly of delegates and in ad-
dition were represented through the British Empire on the inner
council of ten. The British government, as we have seen, treat-
ed the dominions with marked consideration by according them a
permanent place on the British delegation by a system of rota-
tion among the colonies.
"The adoption of the panel system," Sir Robert Borden de-
clared, "gave to the dominions a peculiarly effective position.
At plenary sessions there were sometimes three Canadian plenary
delegates, two as representatives of Canada and one as represen-
tative of the empire. Moreover, throughout the proceedings of the
conference the Dominion delegates as members of the British
52 Ibid.
53 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 750.
54 Speech of Lloyd George at Llanystymdwy, Wales, Dec. 27, 1919.
55 Cong. Rec., p. 8016.
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Empire delegation, were thoroughly in touch with all proceed-
ings of the conference and had access to all the papers recording
its proceedings. This enabled them to watch and check those pro-
ceedings effectively in the interest of their respective dominions
and placed them in a position of decided advantage. Dominion
ministers were nominated to and acted for the British Empire on
the principal allied commissions appointed by the conference
from time to time to consider and report upon several aspects o
the conditions of peace."' 0
The panel system nevertheless was far from satisfactory in
certain important respects. Under this system it was practically
impossible for the dominions to secure adequate representation
on the British delegation.17  The Dominion delegate who sat in
that body could not hope to represent the divergent interests of
the different colonies. This defect was overcome to some extent
in practice by according to the several dominions special repre-
sentation when their particular interests were affected. The
dominions, however, were still placed at a disadvantage by reason
of the fact that their delegation did not possess distinct voting
power in the conference as was the case with the petty indepen-
dent states. The dominions had secured a partial recognition of
their international status but this recognition still fell short of
the full political rights of independent states. They enjoyed the
privilege of participating in the deliberations of the conference
but they had no independent voice in the final determinations.
They appeared in the conference as Dominion representatives,
but they could vote only as members of the British delegation.
This arrangement was manifestly a 'compromise which could not
serve as a satisfactory basis so far as the colonies were concerned
for their permanent representation in the proposed League of
Nations.
Notwithstanding these concessions to the dominions, the other
allied powers still found it difficult to readjust their political pre-
conceptions of the British empire to the new conditions of affairs.
"It took some time," General Smuts subsequently explained,58
"for the position to be realized at Paris because so many of the
powers were under the impression . . . that everything seemed
to be under the tutelage of the British parliament and govern-
ment. They could not realize the new situation arising and that
the British empire instead of being one central government con-
66 Ibid.
57 Keith, The Canadian Constitution and External Relations, J. of
Soc. of Comp. Leg., 1919, No. 42, p. 14.
58 The Round Table, op. cit., p. 192.
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sisted of a league of free states, free, equal and working togeth-
er for the great ideals of humane government. It was difficult
to make people realize this but afterwards they fully applauded
and their approval was given as embodied in this international
document. No doubt new forms would have to be made. No
one recognized this more strongly than the British government
itself but whatever the forms there was no doubt whatever about
the substance of the new status of the dominions."
In the organization of the League of Nations the dominions
scored their greatest victory. The views of the dominions on the
constitution of the League were clearly expressed in a speech of
General Smuts before the South African Parliament.59
"The dominions felt very strongly that if there was to be a
League of Nations in which the nations were to be equally
represented, then that league should'include the British domin-
ions. They were determined to see that that recognition was
given to us but they were equally anxious to see that nothing was
done which would loosen the ties which bound together the Bri-
tish Empire. We kept both these things clearly before our eyes.
Still we wanted our equality with'the rest of the world recog-
nized. We also wanted to remain in the British league of nations
which has worked with such enormous success in the past and
has worked together in this war, probably becoming the real
organizer of victory for all the allies and the rest of the world."
In other words, the dominions were heartily in favor of the
League, provided they could go into it as members of the British
Empire with distinct rights and nationality. The demands of the
dominions in this respect found ample satisfaction in the cove-
nant. The dominions were* accorded separate representation in
the assembly with full voting powers, together with the right of
representation in the council.
But the significance of this concession was not fully under-
stood by all the members of the conference. An excellent illus-
tration of the failure of foreign states to understand the new
position of the dominions was afforded during the closing session
in the controversy over the constitution of the International La-
bor Organization. The dominions were forced to fight their bat-
tle for separate representation all over again. As originally
drafted, the labor convention did not "adequately recognize the
status of the dominions." 0  The Canadian delegation was much
displeased at this omission. Sir Robert Borden accordingly
moved in conference that the resolutions be amended by adding
50 Ibid, p. 193.
60 Cong. Rec., op. cit., p. 8011.
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a provision authorizing the drafting committee "to make such
amendments as were necessary to have the convention conform
to the League of Nations in the character of its membership and
in the method of adherence." Objections were again raised by
some of the delegates to the special representation of the domin-
ions but by keeping up the fight the colonial delegates finally suc-
ceeded in carrying their point. "As a result the labor convention
was finally amended so that the dominions were placed on the
same footing as other members of the international labor organ-
ization, becoming eligible like others to nominate their govern-
ment delegates to the governing body." 61
The dominions' delegates took an active part in the proceed-
ing of the conference. From the very outset they showed a
marked independence of judgment and did not hesitate to oppose
their fellow members on the British delegation when their inter-
ests came in conflict with the policy of the mother land. The
first public utterance of the Canadian premier was a protest
against the policy of the greater powers in withdrawing impor-
tant questions from the consideration of the general body of
delegates.6 2  The interests of Canada in this respect coincided
with those of the smaller nations. The Canadian premier was
much more concerned about preserving the independent rights of
the dominions in the conference than in maintaining the power
and unity of the empire as a whole. The other Canadian dele-
gates likewise played an independent part from time to time.
Mr. Sifton was chiefly responsible for the separate representa-
tion of the dominions in the International Labor Conference.63
It is interesting to observe, moreover, that another Canadian dele-
gate led the fight for the democratization of the constitution
of the League. To this end Mr. Doherty filed a separate memo6
on his own account in favor of the creation of a world parlia-
ment made up of delegates from the parliaments of the respec-
tive members of the League. The entire delegation, it should be
added, also entered a strong protest against any interpretation of
article 10 which would automatically commit every nation of the
61 Ibid.
62 The controversy arose over the inadequate representation of the
smaller nations on the League of Nations committee. Sir Robert Bor-
den objected to "any decisions as to procedure and representation being
taken except by the conference itself." The Times Weekly Edition, Jan.
31, 1919.
63 Mr. Sifton was the Canadian representative on the commission
which drew up the labor convention.
64 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 750.
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League to participate in the quarrels of other members or afford
an unlimited guarantee of the territorial readjustments of the
treaty of peace.
Mr. Hughes, the Australian premier, was the obstreperous
small boy of the imperial delegation. He was an ardent nation-
alist and a fervid imperialist at one and the same time. There
were two subjects in particular in which the Commonwealth
was most vitally interested, namely the question of racial equal-
ity and the disposition of the German colonies in the Pacific. As
a nationalist Mr. Hughes championed the cause of a white Aus-
tralasia. This brought him into a controversy with the Japan-
ese delegates which greatly embarrassed the British government
and even threatened to impair the Anglo-Japanese alliance. But
that danger did not greatly worry Mr. Hughes since he knew
that he could count upon the support of the other British colonies
and the sympathy of the United States. To avoid a breach he
was apparently willing to recognize the general principle of racial
equality provided that the Commonwealth's control of immigra-
tion policy was in no way affected.65 In other words, he would
admit the principle in theory but deny it in effect. Needless to
say, the Japanese would not agree to such a sham settlement of
the question. When the suggested compromise failed Mr.
Hughes became an intransigent and kept up his fight against the
Orientals to the very end. In fact, it required all the tact of
Lloyd George and the pressure of the other members of the im-
perial delegation to prevent an open rupture between the two
countries at the conference.
In the matter of the German colonies Mr. Hughes was a
strong annexationist. He was as staunch an imperialist as Lord
Curzon or any of the other adherents of the old school of Tory
imperialists. He was a nationalist, however, even in his imperial-
ism whenever the interests of Australia were involved; and in
this case he was insistent that the German colonies in the south-
ern Pacific should be added to the Australian Commonwealth
and not placed under the jurisdiction of the British colonial
office.66  He supported this policy not only as a just retribution
on Germany for her crimes but also as a necessary measure of
defense in the Pacific. Australia had long had a Monroe doc-
trine of her own and she did not take kindly to the presence of
65 The Round Table, op. cit., p. 182-3.
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foreign colonial possessions so near her own shores.67  But this
policy did not find much favor with the British or other colonial
delegations. If the policy of annexing the German colonies south
of the equator was adopted, it was pointed out, a similar right
of annexation must needs be conceded to Japan in respect to the
northern group of German colonies. The extension of Japanese
sovereignty to thes6 islands would bring the Japanese menace
even closer to the Australian shores. These counsels of wisdom
ultimately prevailed and Mr. Hughes was forced to be satisfied
with an Australian mandate for the southern Pacific in place of
annexation.
The attitude of the South African delegates, Generals Botha
and Smuts, was strikingly different from that of their Australian
colleagues. They were the earnest champions of the policy of
international reconciliation. They were both strongly of the
opinion that the penalties inflicted on Germany were unduly
severe, especially in respect to the provisions for the wholesale
punishment of individuals. They maintained, on the contrary,
that the terms should be modified in the interests of permanent
peace and future friendship among nations. In short, the policy
of General Botha was directed "to the end that a small number
of the most prominent war criminals should be selected for sum-
mary judgment but that there should not be this indiscriminate
hanging of the sword over Germany."' 68 The work of General
Smuts at the conference is too well known to require extended
comment. He was undoubtedly one of the great outstanding
figures in that gathering of statesmen. To him perhaps more
than to any other man save Lord Robert Cecil, we owe the pro-
ject for a League of Nations ;69 he was the great moderating
influence throughout the course of negotiations and to him is
largely due the mandatory system of colonial administration.
It is safe to prophesy, moreover, that his open message in respect
to the ratification of the treaty of peace and the League of Na-
tions will go down in history as one of the most significant politi-
cal documents of the age.
67At the intercolonial conference, 1883, a resolution was unanimous-
ly adopted "that the further acquisition of dominions in the Pacific,
south of the equator, by any foreign power would be highly detrimental
to the safety and well being of the British possessions in Australia and
injurious to the interests of the Empire." Parl. Pap. 1884.
68 The Round Table, op. cit., 197.
69 See statement of President Wilson to Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, Cong. Rec. op. cit., p. 4272.
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The independent attitude of the dominions at the conference
should convince the most doubting Thomases of the falsity of
the cry of British domination in the League of Nations. The
British government was not able to command the support of the
self-governing dominions at the peace conference on all occa-
sions and there is still less reason to believe that it can succeed in
so doing in the League of Nations. The truth of the matter is
that the dominions look at international questions from a colonial
rather than an imperial point of view. They are nationalists
above everything else. If the interests of the various states of
the empire coincide, the empire acts as a unit, but if on the other
hand they conflict, the several governments feel free to go their
own way. The dominions are a law unto themselves. They
have the power to make and unmake their own political futures.
They have worked out their own distinctive fiscal policies with-
in the empire and there is little doubt but that they will pur-
sue the same independent policies with respect to international
affairs. The colonies will appoint their own delegates to the
League of Nations and these delegates will be responsible only
to their own local governments and legislatures. The very dis-
unity of the empire is the secret of its strength.
With the close of the conference the question of the status of
colonies again came to the front over the method of signing the
peace treaty. The form of signature of the various treaties con-
cluded at the conference marks an important stage in the develop-
ment of the constitutional and international life of the dominions.
"Hitherto," Sir Robert Borden explained, 0 "it has been the
practice to insert an article or a reservation providing for the
adhesion of the dominions. In view of the new position that had
been secured and of the part played by the Dominion representa-
tives at the peace table, they thought this method inappropriate
and undesirable in connection with the peace treaty. According-
ly I proposed that the assent of the king as high contracting
party to the various treaties should in respect of the Dominion be
signified by the signature of the Dominion plenipotentiaries and
that the preamble and other formal parts of the treaties should
be drafted accordingly. This proposal was adopted in the form
of a memorandum by, all the Dominion prime ministers at a
meeting which I summoned and was put forward by me on their
behalf to the British empire delegation by whom it was accepted.
The proposal was subsequently adopted by the conference and
the various treaties have been drawn up accordingly, so that the
70 Cong. Rec., op. cit., p. 8010.
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dominions appear therein as signatories and their concurrence in
the treaties is thus given in the same manner as that of other
nations.
"This important constitutional development involved the issu-
ance by the king as high contracting party of full powers as to
the various Dominion plenipotentiary delegates. In order that
such powers issued to the Canadian plenipotentiaries might be
based upon formal action of the Canadian government, an order
in council was passed on April 10, 1919, granting the necessary
authority. Accordingly he addressed a communication to the
prime minister of the United Kingdom requesting that necessary
and appropriate steps should be taken to establish the connection
between this order in council and the issuance of the full powers
by his majesty so that it might formally appear on record that
they were issued on the responsibility of the government of
Canada."
Another phase of the same question bobbed up at the last
moment, in respect to the ratification of the treaty by the several
dominion parliaments. The British government was in a hurry
to get the treaty out of the way and accordingly proposed that
inasmuch as the dominion ministers had participated in the peace
conference and in signing the preliminaries of the treaty, the
king should proceed at once to ratify the treaty for the whole
empire as he was constitutionally entitled to do. "The king,"
Lord Milner declared,7 1 "by a single act would bind the whole
empire as it is right he should do, but that act would represent
the considered judgment of his constitutional advisers in all self-
governing states of the empire because it would be merely giving
effect to an international pact which they had all agreed to."
But Sir Robert Borden had given "his pledge to submit the treaty
to parliament before ratification on behalf of Canada" and he
was determined to carry out his pledge. The principle of parlia-
mentary ratification, he said, was as applicable to the colonial par-
liaments as to the parliament at Westminster." - In other words, he
insisted that the same constitutional procedure should be follow-
ed in the colonies as in England. The signature of the Dominion
plenipotentiaries could not be considered as equivalent to the
tendering of advice to ratify in the case of the colonies when
parliamentary ratification was deemed necessary in England in
order to carry the treaty into effect in the mother land. In short,
the Dominion parliament should be placed upon an equality with
the British government. The Dominion delegates had signed the
71 Ibid, p. 7176.
72 Ibid.
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treaty on behalf of their respective states. The Dominion par-
liaments should likewise carry the treaty into effect by express
legislative action. A special session of the Canadian Parliament
was accordingly summoned to pass upon the treaty and in a
short period of time parliamentary approval was given to it by
resolution of both houses and an order in council was issued to
give effect to the same. Similar action was taken by the parlia-
ments of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
In laying the treaty before the South African Assembl) Gen-
eral Smuts referred to the significance of dominion signatures
to the peace treaty in the following terms :73
"For the first time in history the British Dominions signed
a great international instrument not only along with the other
ministers of the king but with the other ministers of the great
powers of the world and although the tremendous importance of
this great act has not yet been fully recognized, there is no doubt
that the treaty signed as it has been with the parties to it not only
representative of the king in the British Isles but in the domin-
ions form one of the most important land marks in the history of
the British Empire. The dominions did not fight for status.
They went to war from a sense of duty, from their common
interests with the rest of the world vindicating the great prin-
ciples of free human government. Not only has victory been
achieved for the objects for which they fought but what for the
British Dominions is equally precious, they have achieved inter-
national, recognition of their status among the nations of the
world."
From this review of the theory and practice of colonial par-
ticipation in international affairs we may safely conclude that
there is absolutely no warrant for the frequent charge that the
British government skillfully manipulated the national preten-
sions of the colonies to secure its electoral or political predomi-
nance in the League. The special representation of the dominions
is not the result of a clever conspiracy nor is it a political subter-
fuge. It is rather a stage, though a most important one, in the
long-drawn out progress of the colonies toward a distinct nation-
al and international status. In the course of this progress, as
we have seen, they have often had to overcome the opposition of
the British government as well as of foreign states. But at last
they have realized the most of their desires in the formal recog-
nition of their status in the League of Nations, and that recogni-
tion has come with the full approval of 'all the allied powers
save the United States.
73The Round Table, op. cit., p. 192.
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But the national aspirations of the colonies were not yet fully
realized. The dominions still fell short of a complete international
status. They were included, it is true, in the list of original mem-
bers of the League of Nations, but they were not parties to the
treaty of Versailles. According to the preamble of the treaty the
terms of peace were drawn up by the five principal and associated
powers, the United States, France, Italy, Japan and the British
Empire and 22 other powers on the one side and Germany on
the other, but the name of none of the dominions is to be found
in the list of allied states. The treaty in fact is an agreement
between sovereign states but as the dominions have not yet been
granted international recognition as independent states, they were
not legally qualified to enter into the agreement. From the
standpoint of international law they were still subordinate parts
of the British empire. From a strictly legal viewpoint it must be
admitted that the signature of the dominions to the terms of
peace and the subsequent ratification of the treaty by the several
dominion parliaments were not necessary to the validity of that
instrument, however advantageous they may have been from the
standpoint of imperial relations. The signatures of the Cana-
dian ministers, according to J. S. Ewart, one of the leading con-
stitutional lawyers of the country, were a mere act of supereroga-
tion. They had no more value than would the signatures of the
mayors of any municipalities in England or in Canada.7 4  The
Dominion government and parliament according to this concep-
tion, were simply trying to assume an international importance
which they did not legally possess. The acts of the Canadian
plenipotentiaries were characterized by the Hon. W. S. Fielding
as "an attempt to get a shoddy status where no real status exists."
The further pretense that Canada must give formal and definite
approval to the treaty was "arrant humbug." 75
This criticism is undoubtedly correct as a general legal prop-
osition, but it is nevertheless subject to two important qualifica-
tions. The treaty-making power of the crown is subordinate to
the sovereignty of parliamentY.7  For example, the king could not
enter into an international obligation which would impair the per-
sonal or property rights of any of his subjects.7 7 The intervention
74 Ibid., p. 151.
7 Debate in the Hopse of Commons, The Toronto Globe, Sept. 9,
1919.
76 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, p. 37.
77 Wright, The constitutionality of Treaties, 13 Am. J. of Int. Law 264.
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of parliament would be necessary to give validity to any such en-
gagement. The same principle is equally applicable to the colo-
nies.18 In so far, therefore, as the peace treaty trenched upon the
rights of the colonies, confirmatory action on the part of the do-
minion parliaments was necessary to carry the treaty into effect
within the dominions. In other words, a treaty according to the
English constitution is an international engagement; it is not a
part of the law of the land. For this reason if for no other, the
dominion governments acted wisely in submitting the treaty to
parliament for ratification.
The criticism, moreover, is subject to a second qualification.
The king can undoubtedly bind the whole empire by a declara-
tion of war or by the conclusion of peace but in the exercise of
these great imperial prerogatives he is subject, as we have seen,
to certain conventions of the constitution. He is under a politi-
cal obligation to consult his duly constituted advisers at home
and if possible in the colonies as to the mode of exercising these
powers. The legislative supremacy of the British Parliament
over the dominions has long since disappeared in practice; the
Parliament of Westminster is now a provincial and not an impe-
rial body. A similar transformation is going on in respect to the
royal treaty-making power. The ancient theory of the executive
unity of the empire is going the way of the doctrine of parlia-
mentary sovereignty. In practice the kingship has been divided.
The separate signatures of the dominion ministers at Paris and
the ratification of the treaty by the dominion parliaments is the
most conclusive evidence on this point.
The problem of the international status of the dominions is
in fact an outgrowth of the anomalous constitutional organiza-
tion of the empire. The imperial constitution has a two-fold
aspect, legal and political. According to the law of the consti-
tution, the empire is a great unitary state; according to the con-
ventions of the constitution, it is a confederation of free and
autonomous states. The legal principles of the empire are hope-
lessly at variance with the working relations of the governments
of the several states. The divergence between law and custom
is as marked a characteristic of the imperial as of the British
constitution.7 9 The system has worked well in actual practice
and that is its chief commendation. The dominions have not
78Walker v. Baird. [1892] A. C. 491. 497.
7 Myers, op. cit., p. 108; Ewart, op. cit., p. 58.
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troubled themselves about the legal fiction of the sovereignty of
the British government so long as they have enjoyed the practi-
cal advantages of the management and direction of their own
domestic affairs. In a word, the British Empire has itself be-
come a league of nations.
It is no easy matter to fit this disjointed empire into the mod-
ern national organization of states. According to the political
theory of today, unity and sovereignty are essential character-
istics of a state. The Empire, however, is not a perfect political
unit nor are the dominions sovereign states. The empire has both
a single and a multiple personality; it is six in one and one in six.
Some times it manifests itself as a great imperial state and
again it appears as a loose alliance of more or less discordant
nations with conflicting policies and interests. It is not surpris-
ing in the circumstances that foreign states have been puzzled
as to what kind of an international family this is that is seeking
admission into the League of Nations. The sons of the mother
land have grown up, they have left home and set up establish-
ments of their own, they have entered into contracts in their own
names, but they still claim the rights and share the responsibili-
ties of the old homestead and put off the day of their complete
emancipation. In short, the dominions are minors in law but
they have reached their majority in fact. They are minors in
respect to common imperial matters; they are free-born states in
all that concerns their particular interests. The empire is a unit
for certain purposes; it is divisible for others. The line of de-
marcation between these purposes whether imperial or auton-
omous, cannot be learly drawn as the dominions are constantly
encroaching upon what are supposed to be imperial powers.
Such was the problem which confronted the delegates at Ver-
sailles. The conference had to choose between the principles
of international law and the hard political facts; and when these
two factors come into conflict there can be but one decision in
the long run, viz., the law must give way. The conference wisely
determined to stick close to the realities of the situation by lay-
ing down the principle of the unity of the empire for purposes
of war and peace and by acceding to the demands of the dominions
for separate representation in the League to safeguard their par-
ticular interests. This division is indefensible in principle but
is justifiable in fact. The inclusion of the Dominion representa-
tives in the peace conference and their subsequent admission into
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membership in the League of Nations are simply an international
recognition of the political fact that the dominions have passed
out of the territorial stage of their existence into that of auton-
omous nations.
The covenant of the League is in truth one of the greatest
constitutional and international documents in the history of the
empire. It is scarcely an exaggeration to look upon it in some-
what the same light as the American Declaration of Indepen-
dence. The time had indeed come "in the course of human
events" for the dominions "to assume among the powers of the
earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature
and of nature's God entitled them." The covenant of the
League was both the evidence and the acknowledgment of that
fact. In this case, it is true, the dominions have seen fit to work
out their independence by peaceful methods within the empire
rather than by war and forceful separation. If, then, the politi-
cal independence of the dominions be acknowledgdd in fact it
necessarily follows that the same right of separate representa-
tion must be extended to them as to independent states. Politi-
cal character, not legal form, should be the real test of the right
of admission into the League.8 0  The covenant of the League
gives sanction to that principle.
The American public, it must be confessed, have been largely
indifferent to what has been going on in the outside world. The
Senate likewise has been provincialistic in its outlook. It is evi-
dent from the speeches of some of the members tjhat they have
been but dimly conscious of the constitutional changes that have
taken place in the British Empire.8' They have shown no lack
of appreciation of the war services and the social and economic
development of the dominions, but they have failed to under-
stand the peculiar nature of the relations of the dominions to the
mother country and to foreign states. They have looked at the
external form of the imperial constitution and not at its actual
operations. Least of all have they realized the extent to which
the United States government had already committed itself to
the recognition of the international position of the dominions.
The United States has long had a special interest in promoting
the autonomy or independence of the dominions by reason of its
intimate economic and political relations with Canada. Only a
80 Ibid., p. 107.
81 See speech of Senator Shields, Cong. Rec., op. cit., p. 7879.
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few years ago Secretary of State Bayard protested against the
circuitous mode in which the government of this country was
obliged to carry on its negotiations with Canada through the
British ambassador at Washington and the Foreign Office at
London. 2 This government, as we have seen, was among the
first to recognize the nationalistic aspirations of Canada by enter-
ing into direct relations with Ottawa. It is not long since that
Mr. Taft "invited the Canadian delegates at Washington to be
present as guests at a diplomatic dinner at the White House. '8 3
The United States has constituted itself the foremost champion
of nationalism and democracy throughout the world. It has
always been among the first to recognize a new republican gov-
ernment or state . 4  It is passing strange indeed in these circum-
stances to see this country now hanging back at a time when
foreign nations are hastening to welcome the young democra-
cies of the dominions into the circle of nations.
But in any case it would seem that the opposition of a small
group of senators to colonial representation has come too late.
The right of recognizing foreign states is primarily a presiden-
tial function. To the president is entrusted the power of deal-
ing with foreign states and determining the legitimate govern-
ments of the same.85 When the president admitted the domin-
ion delegates into the conference at Versailles, for all practical
purposes he committed the United States to the further recogni-
tion of the dominions in the League of Nations. The Senate
can undoubtedly lay down the conditions upon which this coun-
try will consent to enter the League. It can properly demand an
equal voting strength with the British Empire or refuse to
assume any obligations, as under the proposed Lenroot reser-
vation,86 "to be bound by any election, decision, report or find-
ing of the council or assembly in which any member of the
82 Tupper, op. cit., p. 9.
83 "The effect," as the Toronto Globe pointed out, "is to proclaim to
the assembled ambassadors of foreign nations that the Dominion of
Canada is sufficiently a nation to be regarded as not out of place among
the real ones." Ewart, The Kingdom Papers, p. 7.
84 Dispatch of Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Rush in respect to recognition
of French Republic of 1848. 1 Moore, Digest of Int. Law 124.
85United States v. Hutchings, (1817) 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 543, Fed.
Gas. No. 15,429; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., (1838) 3 Summ. (U. S.
C. C.) 270, Fed. Cas. No. 17738; U. S. v. Palmer, (1818) 3 Wheat. 634,
4 L. Ed. 471; 1 Moore's Digest of Int. Law 243; Sen. Ex. Doc. 54 Cong.,
2 Sess., no. 54, p. 23.
86 Cong. Rec., op. cit., p. 9226; Allin, Representation on the Council
of the League of Nations, 4 MINNESOr:A LAW Rzvimw 147.
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League and its self-governing dominions, etc., in the aggregate
have cast more than one vote," etc. But the Senate cannot
withdraw, it is submitted, the recognition already accorded by
the president to the dominions at the peace conference. In other
words, the autonomous status of the dominions should be.--no
longer open to question but the voting strength of the empire in
relation to the United States still remains a proper subject for
senatorial determination.
The nationalistic spirit is still running strongly in the colo.
nies. Even the theory of British supremacy is beginning to
prove distasteful. The dominions are looking forward to the
goal of complete constitutional equality with the mother land
and of international equality with foreign states. In the near
future an imperial conference will be called to discuss the whole
question of the future organization of the empire and the rela-
tion of its parts. There is no doubt whatever, in the judgment
of Sir Robert Borden,8 7 but that that relationship "will be based
upon equality of nationhood. Each nation must preserve unim-
paired its absolute autonomy but it must likewise have its voice
as to those external relations which make the issue of peace or
of war." When that day comes the autonomy of the colonies
will be complete.
88
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UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.
87 Cong. Rec., op. cit., p. 8011.
88 It is interesting to observe that at the coronation of King George
the representatives of the dominion were accorded rank with the diplo-
matic representatives of foreign states.
